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CHAPTERX
The Politics of Culture
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From the beginning of its legislated existence the National
Endowment
for the Humanities found itself in conflict with
···:'
the Administration, Congress, and with its own constituency.
Our grantees were grateful for our services, but most of them
would ha,·e preferred a steady flow of federal subsidy. They
· did not like to make repeated applications, and it was their
dream to become line-items on the Federal Budget: mandated
' recipients of funds given by entitlement. The Administration
was the least of our difficulties, except that it routinely tried,
and increasingly succeeded, in making appointments to the
National Council on the Humanities dependent purely upon
political affiliation. Congress was the greatest of our difficul. ties, not because it exhibited many direct improprieties or tried
to influence the giving of grants to specific individuals or
\ institutions but because it tried consciously and continuously to
:'._ · divert the budget of the agency away from professional and
),'. towards public benefits.
·
.ii:i.~ If I may for the moment briefly review the congressional
·• (situation: in the Senate, Claiborne Pell, who controlled the
· ~- legislation governing the agency, had tried since its inception
·~to convert the humanities into a form of cultural welfare. He
,:wanted five percent of the funds given to individual citizens
~without college training. Such funds would be divided among
·."grocers" and "lumberjacks" (the terms were his own, often
}alluded to in hearings, statements to the press, on the floor of
: the Senate) in order to provide them with after-hours enjoy·,ment of the great books. Each grocer and each lumberjack
would receive five hundred dollars to do so. In addition,
.Senator Pell wanted another twenty percent of the agency's
funds to go directly to the states each year. It did not especially
·matter what these funds produced; what mattered only was
rthe audience they reached. They were to be assigned to citizen's committees on the humanities in each of the fifty states.
,.,_.The power of the sub-committee Chairman was such that
t1.."!w
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the agency had to comply. And, until 1976, there was a \vorkable compromise. NEH funded a group of such citizen's committees, having first made sure that they were composed of
teachers, librarians, curators, and other professionals. These
groups were encouraged to apply for funds annually to the
mother agency, and to spend such funds on education. By
I 976 such groups were operational in all fifty states and, while
I did not think of them as ideal solutions to the problem I did
believe that they were moderately successful. On the negative
side, the work they did was sometimes indistinguishable from
general social discourse. They loved to sponsor public debates
on over-population, divorce, alcoholism and other anxieties.
They spent much money on their own little bureaucracies.
They funded projects that did not do much for the advancement of the humanities. On the positive side, they were all
volunteer, and so took no salaries. They raised impressive
amounts of loc;al gift-and-matching money. They sent money
to community colleges, libraries and civic associations. They
became enthusiasts, and lobbied for the agency whenever a
congressional district needed to express approval of our
operations.
Senator Pell insisted on more direct political benefits. He
wrote into the law the requirement that NEH, like NEA, had to
give away twenty percent of its budget each year to citizen's
committees in each state. He insisted that the governor of each
state appoint the members of those committees. In short, he
wished to make them political entities which would be adversaries of the Endowment, and he succeeded in accomplishing
that.
It might be noted that there was nothing in the charter which
suggested all this. At no time during the current change in
legislation was it implied that, by doing this, teaching might be
improved, research sustained, or libraries, universities and
museums benefitted. The policy had no object of making
education in the humanities better or even more available. It
was simply a means to insure a flow of cash from Washington
to the states.
The usual way for laws to take shape is for consultation. to
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occur between Congress, lobbyists, and the Executive agencies
involved. But only the first two took part in deliberations this
time. Before I knew anything about the intentions of Senator
Pell he had put draft language into our new authorization bill.
It stipulated that the entire State-Based program be replaced
by state humanities "councils," which is to say by state bureaucracies. These did not exist, and would have to be called into
existence. I found that NEH had been lied to by the Senator
and his staff. After assurances that all was going well with our
bill I found that there would be hearings with hostile witnesses
who would incorporate themselves into "councils" as soon as
the law was passed. There is a difference between giving
everyone his day in court and allowing the fox into the chicken
coop.
Information had been withheld, the provisions of the new
law had been covered up, and the agency was to be stripped of
a large part of its funds. I made the tactical error ofletting Pell
and his staff know that I knew this. Although lies are common
enough in Congress this one was embarrassing. It had been
called, and the Senator's stock in trade was morality. He had
several choices, one of them being to tell the truth. Another, as
is the way with Congress, was to patch things over without
bothering much about right or wrong. He decided instead to
demand that the White House not re-appoint me to a second
term as Chairman.
I did not at first take him seriously, underestimating his
power and malice, the weakness of the new Ford administration, and the privileges allowed by the Senate to its members.
The grounds of the Senator's complaint to the White House
Personnel Office were that I did not manage well, was powermad, and ran a poor State-Based Program. Since he had made
it his business annually to praise me in the pages of the
Congressional Record for both management and character it
~ made an odd lot of accusations.
' In an effort to extract my nomination for a second term
·. from the White House I reminded the President's staff that
·· Pell had no claim on their affections. They told me that neither
~.did I. They might actually stand to gain by placating a promi-
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nent Democrat, and vacating an office which patronage might
fill once more.
It seemed to me that planning to lose a conflict was a poor
way to enter it. If the White House did give in grac~l~ssly then
members of the National Council on the Humamues would
resign, the staff of the agency would become demoralized, and
every politico in Washington would know that the Endowment
could be shaken down. And in fact, a few days after I conveyed
that, Sidney Hook, a prominent member of the Council said
that he would indeed resign if I had to leave.
My congressional aide got to Pell's office meanwhile, and
found one of the reasons for his malaise. Pell had been so
embarrassed by the mail and calls coming in to his office, most
of which he had solicited in favor of his new amendment, that
only my blood could wash away the offense. It seems that his
friends and consultants, of whom there were many, agreed
with me about the State-Based Program, and disagreed with
him about the management of NEH.
The .malignancy took a year or so to develop. Early in
October of 1976 the Senator caught up with Robert Goldwin,
who was to the Ford White House in some respects what
Leonard Garment had been to the NLxon Administration, and
informed him that I was to be charged with certain things.
First, that the agency had failed an audit by the General
Accounting Office. Pell tended to blunder in these things, and
unhappily found the next day that NEH had in fact ~d the.
audit; it being recommended by the GAO that the Chamnan
be given even more authority than the law presently allowed.
After this the Senator accused me of having lost the confidence
of the Council and demanded a poll on my re-appointment.
Twenty out of twenty-one insisted that I be re-appointed. He
was mortified, and looked for other charges.
Frank Vandiver, Vice-Chairman of the Council, met with
Robert Goldwin early on the 4th of November 1975 and then
spent the afternoon with Senator Pell. The mornin~ interview
went well, it having been established that the White House,
which had no real stake in my appointment, could not find any
reasons not to go ahead with it. But the meeting with Senator
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Pell was somewhat different. Although Frank Vandiver had
been able to supply a rebuttal for every accusation, the Senator
kept to his assertions: that my relationships with the Council
were poor, that the Endowment was badly run, and the StateBased Program ineffective. He found no difficulty in contradictions: that the Council had recently requested my reappointment, and that the State-Based Program had won the
support of his own consultants. Frank found the Senator's
reaction in excess of the facts, and we both supposed that it had
not much relation to them. The next day my name went up to
the Personnel Office for a new term on the job.
I met with Jack Javits in his office the same day. He, too,
disliked the State-Based Program but we quickly found a
compromise: the committees would remain voluntary but the
members would be annually re-appointed, some of them by
the Governor of each state. Javits promised to back my appointment and to persuade Pell to it. I left feeling not too badly
about things. But, a day or so later three of the ablest Council
members went to see Pell and he put them through the
wrin&'er, now threatening to sever the two Endowments, cut
:iu~:::et and punish the agency in other ways for my

.i~?:"_

I then went up to see Pell, answered his charges and listened
while he complained that his own committee disagreed with
him about my appointment. I soothed him, and said that I'd
much rather win with his cooperation th-an over his dead body;
all very appropriate for the face-saving involved. I went over
everything, but succeeded only in settling the issues. He did
not want the issues settled.
There was a good talk with John Brademas a few days later.
, Al Quie and John Brademas were to my mind never to be
\ praised enough; as the situation developed it was only the
~· House that kept our bill from being the kind of punishment
~,. that Pell had in mind.
.;
Next day, the 13th of November, I went up before the
;. Senate for the authorization hearing. Pell began with a state~ ment of his beliefs, without referring to the evidence that had
~nullified them. There was the now-predictable passage on
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grocers and shoemakers; and some alarmin? disench~ntment
with academics and intellectuals. He complamed contmuously
at the waste of money on an educated elite. I managed to avoid
questions intended to entrap me by ignoring them in the ~ope
that they would sink out of sight in the closed committee
hearings. My strategy was to take away the initiative whenever
possible. When the Senator made personal remarks I let them
go; when he carped at the agency I combined respect ~nd
contradiction. When he stumbled about I changed the subject.
Nancy Hanks and John Brademas bucked me up on the
performance.
.
Shorcly after this I met Barry Goldwater who said that hew~
having a rough time convincing Pell. He told me that Bill
Baroody, President of the American Enterprise Institute and a
great stalwart, had been on the phone a half-hour with him
over this. Goldwater was not optimistic. Don Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, was brought in as a friend of the court by
Len Garment and Bill Buckley. Bob Goldwin called, somewhat
embarrassed by having to ask my political registration. The
White House was under the impression that I was not a
R.epubl.ican, which may have accounted for some of the di~fi
culties. Bob was as ever very helpful, but I could not qmte
believe the implications. I hoped they had Brezhnev on file
under the Soviet Union.
Another audit for NEH: Pell was fighting now with every
weapon at his command. He insisted that the nomination be
delayed-for months--while the audit was under way. I refused, and told the White House we had to go ahead with it or
have it die of inertia. But Goldwin got the same story from the
head of the White House Personnel Office. The good news was
that Pell had now withdrawn his charges. The audit, delay and
Senatorial privilege were all he had left; they were probably
enough.
·
.
Until this time Livingston Biddle, Pell's assistant, had tried to
mediate; now, recognizing that his principal was immoveable,
and that he had only two choices, he decided to humor the
patient. Pell and Biddle claimed to the White House and to the
media that NEH was not as successful as the Endowment for
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' · · the Arts, at least as measured by coverage and approval of the
media. It was true enough; but of course the same could have
been said of the National Science Foundation. I couldn't do
much with Pell and Biddle, but did get to see Jack Javits and
explain the difference between visibility and presence. The
first was the effect of a performance on the media. The second
was the effect of thought in society. Thought is not really an
event, and what the humanities do is not visible to the naked
eye.Javits saw the distinction, and agreed that NEH should not
be held accountable for having a less enthusiastic press than
the Arts. We talked about the full partnership of the two
agencies, and especially about parity in their budgets. Javits
was pleasancly surprised to see how much we did for New
York, probably a deciding factor for him.
There was more from Bob Goldwin on the tenth of the
month: the nomination was pretty well stuck in the White
House Personnel Office. Bill Baroody went to work on it once
more. It became dear that the White House would not help
out, even to the extent of getting Pell's committee on my side.
Both conservatives and liberals had recently attacked the
agency's policies, especially those which tended to popularize
culture. There was no reason for them not to do so. But
common sense urged an equilibrium between public and pro/ ..' fessional benefits. Neither should dominate: not promoting
· ,,~, research too narrow for public fonding, nor the political
,}[f distribution of money to every one who wanted it. But Pell now
.'~)· issued a committee report affecting the agency itself, urging
:~t tha~ the .culture: of "~ens of m_illions of Americans" become our
-:~Jf,.; major aim. This might be either no culture at all, or several
rf•· cu llures too many. If t h e 1'd ea was to b nng
. h umamues
.. to as
'!,:~;
·.:-~: many people as possible that was well enough. But if it meant
, giving money to voters without asking too many questions
.about how it would be used that was something else.
"'·' I thought the meaning was clear. Pell was in a lather of
;anti-intellectualism, willing to confuse professionalism with
elitism, and ultimately looking for a stick to beat a dog. What:ever we were not doing was his ground for complaint.
~ii In early January 1976 Goldwin told me that Pell had spoken
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to the Congressional Liaison Office of the White House and
restated his opposition to my appointment. I was told by a
friend in the White House bureaucracy that I would be kept in
limbo until after the presidential election. My name would not
after all be sent up to the Senate for confirmation. It was
enormously depressing.
But there was a radical alteration on the seventh: the day
beginning with Senator Buckley phoning me at home to ask
how he could help out. I talked to him several times, and he
told the White House what he expected of them. By the close of
business that day the cork had popped out of the bottle. He
must have been marvelously firm: I was left for dead on
Monday, gave up on Tuesday, and found by Wednesday that I
was scheduled for nomination within two weeks. I knew that
there would be a formidable coalition of conservatives and
liberals on the case; and I suspected a tremendous send-off
from the media.
The disproportion between power and logic was sometimes
preny funny. Pell was free to say anything he wanted, but
could make almost nothing stick. The week that he began his
campaig~ on the invisibility of the agency both Time and
Newsweek devoted more space to the Adams Family Chronicle
than to the presidency. It was a mad success in Washington,
drawing the sympathy of almost everyone in public life; and
appreciation from those who followed the development of
public television. The object now was to intensify public appreciation for NEH, and there were good responses from columnists like John Roche, Nick Thimmesch, Max Frankel and
Anne Crutcher, all of whom planned to cover the case. The New
York Times was sympathetic, but not to the point of running an
editorial against a senator who had for so long embodied its
views. The Washington Post simply maintained silence; the issue
being invisible to them for the whole course of things. I
thought their indignation over fair practices in government
mightily selective. The- issue was not after all whether they
agreed with me, but only whether a hearing could be infinitely
postponed, so that neither side could be stated in an accountable way.
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At the same time, the third week in January 1976, the second
GAO audit came to a close. I met with the five auditors and my
Deputy, Robert Kingston, and was a witness to one of the great
performances of the bureaucracy fighting back. Kingston had
mastered the entire procedure, and knew more about the
report than those who had made it. He uncovered every flaw
mercilessly, and got the auditors to admit .their humiliation
over the covert intention of the investigation and the way it had
been carried out. They agreed to conclude that there was
nothing unfavorable to me or NEH, and one more of the
obstacles had disappeared. For intelligence and rarelyappropriate moral indignatjon Kingston couldn't be topped; a
nice moment in our finale.
Irving Kristol and many others converged on the AFL-CIO
to get the endorsement of Lane Kirkland and George Meany.
There was an hilarious afterthought: the unions wrote Pell
that since our State-Based Program did so much for labor
organizations, and had so many contacts with their members, it
should be left exactly as it was. Arthur Hertzberg, former
President of the American Jewish Congress, saw one of the
key men in the mess, Harrison Williams, chairman of Pell's full
committee. ~illiam~ would ultimately decide whether to judge
the case on Its merits or by the rules of senatorial courtesy.
The Adams show continued to attract the media, Times, Post
and Star giving it enormous praise for_ the rest of the month. A
long piece on the politics of the appointment came out in the
Star, in which I was accused of reluctance to support nonsense,
of being unwilling to politicize the Endowment or to chase
publicity; not impeachable offenses. The article also mentioned that NEH had passed its audit with flying colors. I was
clearly ahead in every respect except that of dealing with the
powers and privileges of the Senate.
I had the first of many long talks with Arthur Krim, ·who
supported me from his vantage point in Democratic politics.
The American Jewish Committee weighed in, sending its chief
lobbyist, Hy Bookbinder, to the Hill to argue the case. AIthough the usual thing in Washington is for a man to twist
slowly in the wind, this matter became an honorable exception.
113
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Wherever I looked, people spoke up to disregard the custom
of the place.
There were good talks with John Brademas, who undertook
to carry things to Pell; with a former Council member, Bob
Ward of Stanford, who knew that it would be important to see
Alan Cranston; and even with people from the Arts Endowment. And there was a not especially good talk with Pell on the
29th of January, which really did bring some things out in the
open.
I spent about a half-hour with him, going over the Adams
Family Chronicle, and drawing the admission that this grant had
sen:ed those "tens of millions of Americans" he had in mind.
H~ added that he liked me personally, but was going to block
my appointment. He would do that by tabling the nomination
in his sub-committee and preventing a vote on it, or passage to
the Senate floor. More or less at his wit's end to find a reason
for this, he said that his standard of reappointment was now
"exceptionally outstanding" performance-and whereas I had
only ·been outstanding, I could not hope for another term. I
was tempted to ask him for his opinions on service in the
Senate. At any rate, it seemed pretty dear that he was determined to find or invent some criterion th<1t I could not exceed.
He left briefly for a roll-call, and Livingston Biddle then tried
to blackmail me into submission.
Biddle suggested that I would be vulnerable to public
charges about my administration of the agency, that a confrontation with so virtuous a Senator would ruin my character,
and that it would be safest for me to depart and head some
fortunate university. I suggested that if it came to being defeated in committee the Senator might change his mind. Biddle said that the GAO report would give Pell whatever he
needed to damage me-and with some incredulity I asked ifhe
knew what was in it. He did not. When I told him that the
auditors had agreed not to criticize me, and suggested only a
few cosmetic improvements in office procedures, he was visibly shocked. As I left the office my congressional liaison aide
was somewhat upset, and told me ·that the Senator had offered
him a job in his own office if he would get off the case.
114

Andrew Biemiller, sent over by the AFL-CIO to help me,
was offe~ed a ~ompromise by Pell: I could stay on the job until
th~ elec?on. Smee that was no compromise at all I asked the
umons to press somewhat harder for a hearing. Senator Cranston gave a flat assurance to Caroline Ahmanson, our Council
mem~r from Lo~ Angeles, that he would support me; had he
kept his word I might now be making grants instead of writing
about them. I was worried about Javits because he had dose
personal and political ties with Pell. But his constituents were
hot and heavy after him to support me.
I was invited over to the ~yburn Building to talk to Frank
Thompson, one of the founders of NEH legislation. I hadn't
realized that his interest began as early as 1955, a decade
before anything actually happened. Thompson went over
Pell's opposition to my appointment, and we talked about the
reasons first raised to oppose me and their abandonment.
Thompson said, much to his credit, that he and John Brademas would actively campaign for me. It was a fine gescuremuch more than a gesture-Crom a man not actively involved
on any of the Endowment's committees, and on the other side
of the political fence. He gave me good advice if I should ever
get out of this, to spend mor~ time on the Hill mending that
fence.
I had another long session with the GAO auditors, who
proved to b~ decen~ men. They had corrected everything
called to theIT attenuon by Bob Kingston, and wanted me to
t~.. know that the report in its final form had nothing damaging to
>i"' me. They thought, however, that it might be used out of
context. They regretted that; so did I.
;..;~Y
I visited John Brademas on the 6th of February; he had seen
'.:Pell but been rebuffed. We both foresaw a conflict now, to be
X won by me with as little show of force as possible. A good
.. strate~. for keeping the support of the Senate while fighting
• the pnvilege of a Senator; but it didn't work in Korea or Viet
; Nam. Then to Jack Javits; and at that point I took some relief in
:what ~e could say. He undertook to handle my confirmation in
. committee, even though he too had been rebuffed by Pell. He
:felt sure of Harrison Williams, the great unknown. Javits
.·":"-•
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advised me not to let up on contact with committee members,
and to have the nomination delivered to the Senate as soon as
possible. He agreed that Pell's opposition was irrational, but ·
felt that it had to be handled tenderly. Javits was very intelligent, with an eye for my media support and the cowardice of
the ·white House.
The media response that had de\·eloped and was to come
still strikes me as remarkable. Senator Pell began by literally
charging that the Endowment, when judged by its press clippings, failed the test of publicity. He dropped this charge with
some anguish as the issue generated skyrockets and barrages
of coverage, almost all in farnr of his opposition. He later
replaced this charge with the complaint that the press had
become captive to the agency.
Some of the press coverage came from newspapers and
journals unknown to me and was simply based on the issues.
Some came from writers who were both friends and associates:
John Roche had been a Council member before my term and
understood the issues. Anne Crutcher of The Washington Star
had been a panelist, and wrote with superb intelligence about
the agency's purpose and situation. Jeffrey Hart was appointed to the Council by President Nixon, and was deeply
motivated by shared ideas and very close friendship. Their
coverage was in itself a political spectrum: John Roche was on
Lyndon Johnson's White House staff and a former President
of ADA; Jeffrey Hart is an editor of N atWnal Review. There was
in addition a third force, a kind of one-man gang: Roger
Rosenblatt, who had left the Education Division of NEH to
become Literary EditoroftheNewRepublic. Because of him the
New Republic joined National Review, at least on this issue, and
quite frankly drove Senator Pell crazy with its anger and wit.
The conflict with Pell awakened all kinds of sleeping dogs.
The agency was now perceived to be weak, and ready for
plundering. One Congressman took me to task because NEH
grants were being given only to those qualified to use them.
This was felt to be undemocratic. A group of state-college
presidents informed me that they wanted one of their own on
the Council, and many of their own on our panels. They also

:I
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wanted revised standards in their own special case, and annual
quotas of our money. They were pretty much perfect examples of constituency politics: men of little mind, some character
and much f ~miliarity with legislatures. And they represented
the alternative to my confirmation.
A Washington Star editorial appeared on the 18th of February, all fire and brimstone. It enraged Pell, who played the
buffoon of the piece. His office called mine to break off
diplomatic relations. One the other hand, Sid Yates called to
say that it was just the right thing. The President sent my name
up to the Senate just after this; it was clear that the battle would
go public in a fairly noticeable way.
I began the _week of the 23rd of February by calling on
Senator Schweiker who was an Adams Chronicl.e fan and we
spent some time talking over the confirmation. Then there was
a call from the Majority Leader's office, telling me to show up
right away. Mike Mansfield had never heard of the Adams
grant, and knew nothing of NEH: in fact he asked me why I
was in his office. I stumbled around for a moment or two, then
described the Pell business. Mansfield said simply that there
were other m~mbers of the committee, and that I better get
around t~ see1~g th~m all: t~e subtext evidently being that I
was all-nght with him. But 1t was an unnerving interview;
Mansfield was famously vague and silent and I had to ask
myself questions and then answer them.
On the 5th of February there was _an authentic Great Mo.. ment in Government: John Barcroft, Director of the Endow., ment's Public Division, won the Arthur Fleming award for,
_:§;: among other things, the design of our State-Based program.
.f"> Pell was at the moment trying to corrupt our legislation, divert
,;'.:ti!:', our budget and deny my confirmation because of this
- '; program; and could not have been made to look more foolish
,. intentionally.
_: The dance of courtesy began. Senator Williams was ap{ proached by more intermediaries. I got word from Jay Hall,a
r, Council Member and lobbyist for General Motors that he had
~spoken to Jennings Randolph on my behalf. Randolph mat.: tered a good deal-he was the senior Senator in office, and of
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course right at the top of the sub-committee. Randolph gave
his word to support me, from which he never deviated.
There was a half-hour interview on the first of March with
Senator Eagleton, interested but non-committal. Then a talk
with Cranston, who again lied that he would support me.
Senator Hathaway likewise; so that I had what appeared to be
all the Republican votes and most of the Democratic ones. At
this point, if everyone kept his word, Pell seemed outnumbered.
I had a very good talk with Senator Stevens of Alaska, who
had taken over from Alan Bible on the appropriations committee. Our hearing came up on the 3rd of March, and Stevens
ended\t with the unnecessary but welcome remark that my
work had been "outstanding." The Star emphasized that the
next day; "outstanding" by now having come to be a kind of
code phrase in Washington which indicated that all who used it
lined up on my side. I wondered if Pell was going to ransack the
dictionaries for another standard.
Then came the fateful talk with Harrison Williams on the
fourtn of March. He had evidently had his ears filled by Pell
and could make nothing of the issues. He said that Pell told
him we had "philosophical" differences, a new entrant in the
vocabulary of this issue. By the end of the hour he was wearily
shaking his head over what seemed to be pretty familiar
behavior. He said that he would put his staff on the case and let
me know. For all the assurances that he was sympathetic he
didn't seem enthusiastic; or much interested. And at his level
of seniority in the Senate the matterofNEH must have seemed
like a buzzing mosquito.
The new legislation proposed by Pell appeared on the 10th
of March; it was clearly designed to take out on the agency the
resentment that I had raised. NEH was to be cut ten million
dollars below NEA; and there were a variety of other provisions which seemed vindictive: cuts in our gift and matching
allowance as well as in the total amount of money available and
restrictions of other kinds. When Bob Kingston went up to see
Biddle on the 12th of March he was told that the bill was
"punitive," an attack on the agency because it was more vul-
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nerable than its Chairman. It was an astonishing admission.
From now on authorization and confirmation would be tied
in a Gordian knot, and most of Pell's energies would go
towards crippling the agency.
The first of two meetings with Jack J avits took place on the
15th of March, prompted by the more incendiary provisions of
Pell's bill. I went overthe probable reaction of some of the most
powerful and vocal cultural institutions in this country to a law
that would cut their resources because its author could not get
at me. Javits would be perceived as a willing co-author, and get
more headaches over authorization than over the confirmation itself. He was quite furious, and determined to get the bill
back to normal: among the things that aggravated him was the
realization that the wreckage of our State-Based program
would now make it possible for Nevada and Utah to get as
much money as New York.
At that point all was hopeful, Pell having created his own
opposition even among those connected to him. But by the end
of the month Javits slipped away. We met again, and he said
that Pell had refused to yield. In the light of that-and of his
own close personal relationship to Pell-he could only advise
me to wait until after the election. I pointed out that he had
promised to help; and that he was after all the ranking Minority Member.
He sighed like a man familiar with moral dilemmas, and said
that I should canvass the committee tQ see if one Democrat and
,,. one Republican would crash its agenda for me. Good advice,
fi but the case had in effect been closed. The Senate runs by
:.'•ii_:,.·-· procedure, and there is no other way to get it to acL I would
,
have to break that procedure now while Pell would be protected by it. There were a dozen members of the committee
ready to vote for me, and perhaps one or two against: but they
would never come to that vote unless the ranking minority
Member forced it. I knew enough about Javits not to be
. . surprised, and left in good order. But it was clear not that I had
;; lost, although I would spend the next six months fighting as
·~ hard as possible.
· A few days later Javits' aide said that there would be a new
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strategy, with the Senator pulling for me on the sidelines, but
not officially in the fight. The scenario was to approach
Schweiker and Jennings Randolph, and have them introduce
my name before the committee. They would, if possible, break
into the agenda of other business and request the committee to
act.
The American Jewish Committee got into high gear, and
made me the keynote speaker at its annual meeting in Washington. President Ford was the other main speaker, so that
their feelings lost no emphasis. Hy Bookbinder hoped by this
to draw Javits' attention to what his constituents thought.
April saw dozens of little things that may or may not have
added up: Jay Hall and Bill Baroody went once more to
Senator Randolph, and once more got his assurance that I had
at least one Democratic vote on the committee. There was a
phone call from O'Hare airport from Len Garment, who had
just escaped from a forty-five minute interview with Pell in
New York. Pell was determined not to have me as Chairman,
but was still without a reason; he did say that the would write
into th"e authorizing bill that no Chairman could be reappointed without having done an "extraordinary" job. He
still threatei:ied revelations that would ruin me, if the matter
ever came to a hearing. I still invited him to state them. He still
declined the opportunity.
In early May I had lunch with Don Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, on a mission very different from most of its business. He
thought that Senator Hathaway, who aspired to naval installations in Maine, might be the right man to break the procedural
knot.
In May Pell was defeated in committee over the State-Based
amendment. Javits tried five or six forms of compromise, and
came up with something pretty much like what he and I had
thought would do. The House promised to sustain my position, so that Pell failed in his first great aim, which was to
punish the agency because of me. Those present at the hearing
said that it was pretty much a dead loss for him, and something
of a humiliation; which was a great satisfaction to the smallminded, myself among them.
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By early June the media had become much involved. There
were articles and editorials, before all this was over, in The New
Republic, The Washington Post, The Washington Star, The New York
Post, The New York Daily News, National Review, The Wall Street
Journal and many in between. George Will noted that the
differences were both political and idiosyncratic:
NEH offends some political sensitivities because it bestows benefits in a non-political way on the basis of merit.
. .. Pell wants the money to go in block grants as a matter
of right, not merit, to paid state agencies, appointed by
governors.... Pell has wistfully but not wisely hoped that
NEH would wind up supporting "lumberjacks" and
"grocers" and "shoemakers." The arts endowment can
do that: Anyone can dabble at watercolors, or weld car
bumpers.into something the arts endowment considers
art. But NEH can hardly give a lumberjack $500 to
dabble at, say, historical research.
Anne Crutcher's editorial in the Star was formidable, concentrating on the perversion of due process and the fact that
everyone on the committee except Pell was ready to vote; and
to approve the nomination. It hit Pell pretty hard, and for a
while made me think force was counter-productive; but other
members of the committee thoug~t it accomplished its
purpose.
The editorial did in fact prove to be the right medicine. A
good friend of mine was called by Harrison Williams, now
uncomfortable enough to be provoked into action. He was
angry and frustrated by Pell, and had nothing particular
against me. Williams was something of an old-time politician,
and like everyone else except Pell wanted an arranged solution. But Pell insisted now that I was guilty of"elitism"-which
had Senator Williams scratching his head and looking for a
dictionary. At any rate he said the committee would meet to
talk about a hearing. What a way to get the democratic process
started.
Getting the committee to talk about the matter was like
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milking a bull. I spent the next month in correspondence with
Williams, trying to get him to eat his words. A basic pattern did
seem to emerge: when Javits, Hathaway, Williams and others
were first contacted they expressed doubt about Pell's seriousness, and surprise at his position. There was a high ratio of
initial support for me, corroborated by contact with the press
or local constituencies. But trade-offs and senatorial courtesy
then silenced the other Democrats on the committee. They
expressed private sympathy and said that if it ever came to a
vote on the appointment, no matter what Pell wanted they
would vote for me. But if it came to a vote on whether or not to hold a
hearing, they would have to vote against me. It was literally a
Catch-22: they would not allow a meeting to take place; but if it
did, I could have their votes.
The legislation went well because of supernatural activity on
the agency's part, and because the opposition could find so
little to justify. The House continued to fight the Senate
version of the bill; and Blanchette Rockefeller, a Council
Member, successfully argued parity of the two agencies to
javits. Somewhat to my surprise, it looked as if none of the
provisions in Pell's bill would ever become law; that all he had
accomplisheµ was to defeat himself in this matter while looking
pretty bad at the same time.
Meanwhile, the stakhanovites never stopped work. jay Hall
kept on top of the business with Jennings Randolph, Arthur
Krim phoned tirelessly on my behalf, Hy Bookbinder did
everything but take the state of New Jersey apart in the effort
to find something that would be an irresistible argument to
Williams. There were even angry articles on my behalf in Pell's
hometown paper, The Providence Journal, and Williams', The
Trenton Times. It turned out that NEH was not invisible to the
media.
A Wall Street Journal editorial appeared on the first of July,
containing among other things an analogy between Pell and
the inept Wayne Hays. Williams saw it, and was exercised. He
gave a counter-statement to The Trenton Times saying that there
would definitely.be a hearing. A new administrative assistant
took over Pell's office, and told my congressional man that
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Pell's opposition was fathomless and not to be explained; and
that he thought it about the silliest thing the Senator had ever
done. The best thing, he thought, was for us to apply the same
kind of pressure in Rhode Island that we had done nationally.
It appears that Pell was encouraged by the relative quiet in his
home state, although he was taking his lumps elsewhere. It was
an excellent thought, and we heated up newspapers, constituents and contributors wherever they could be found.
The press had done an enormously effective job up to now;
and I was grateful for its training-diet on Watergate. I would
have been nowhere if it were not for the newspapers. Television ignored the matter; it was complex and not on their scale
of public interest. Editorials and columns worked where nothing else would; and it was necessary to go outside of government in order to get government to function. In a way, my
opposition had brought it on their own heads. Because Pell
had so little to prove he fell in love with the idea of stating his
reservations in a way that promised real disclosures, if not
some scandal. By biting the ankles of the agency, however; he
invited the opposition of the press. After his first argument
was undone, that I was incapable and unsatisfactory, he went
on to develop some favorite themes for them. The extent to
which this backfired can be judged from The Providence Journafs lead, "Pell Seeking To Bring Humanities To Mom and
Pop Stores."
Nearly all the coverage was based on disgust with congressional procedures and Pell; but one piece, in the not very
widely distributed Washington International Arts Letter, had
some shrewd things to say about the side~ffects of legislation.
It began with the observation that Pell would attempt to have
all nominations for the NEA and NEH councils subject to
confirmation by the Senate. It sounded harmless, but would in
fact involve eyen more politics than those forced on us by the
White House Personnel Office. Not only would there be the
normal attractions of patronage: Pell wanted labor to be "represented" on both Councils; which was simply to give the
unions a chance actively to lobby for grants within the agencies.
And Javits wanted someone from the fashion industry on the
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Arts Council because he thought that fashion was part of the
Arts, if not part of his constituency. Given the thrust of politics,
there would be walloping benefits for an enterprise clearly
commercial. Fashion in New York City and hobbies for the
retired in Iowa were part of a new social definition: art, at least,
was what people wanted to do when it was paid for by p~litic~.
As Agnes De Mille put it in the Times, "they're spreadmg It
around geographically, like Kiwanis." The contours of a new
definition for humanities were fairly plain.
On the 15th ofJune I met withjavits' aide, Greg Fusco, who
was throughout honest and helpful. Fusco pointed out that it
would be to my advantage to have action on the bill delayed
until after confirmation. Pell would then not have the excuse
that the appointment should be made only after the new bill
had been passed, while, of course, doing everything possible to
make passage of the bill impossible. Right then he was contentedly sending out two different messages to House and
Senate: the latter understanding that he would be pleased to
have a hearing after authorization; the former that he would
never agree to anything on the conference agenda that was
likely to let the bill go through. If his colleagues were to play
ball with.him, the nomination would lapse with the end of the
congressional session.
But by the end ofJuly both J avits and Williams had evidently
had enough from friends, constituents, lobbyists, media, and
everyone else on the case. They agreed to a hearing before the
end of the session. Williams even made a little speech on the
floor of the Senate guaranteeing a hearing-after the conference. Since the conference would by every indication take
place at the very end of the co~gressional sessio? th~re would
be no time left to hold a heanng; and the nommauon would
lapse. Williams' speech had the effect of assuring everyone that
the Senate would act while allowing it not to, which was a rather
clever way of neutralizing my supporters.
The time-wasting began again. The American Jewish Committee sent off a rattling telegram to Williams stating what they
thought of his maneuver. Once again the telephones were
started, and all over the country academics put pen to hand
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again. The New Republic and the Wall Street]ournal came out for
me again, so that a little more light was on the matter than the
committee wanted.
It was a pretty good week for the media; Newsweek spent a lot
of time preparing coverage (never printed) which had the
effect of galvanizing the committee. The New York Daily News
pitched in with an editorial, and Pat Buchanan did a column.
The conference committee actually met, and to most people's
surprise, including my own, made progress on the bill. Activity
became frantic, with friends on left and right drumming up
the case, raging against the Senate in New Republic and National
Review at the same time. The Star did a piece on the conference
which sounded fine until one got to Pell's plan for picking up
beer cans as part of the ideal humanities program.
As a result of the renewed press activity, a hearing materialized on the 15th of September, in the last days of the congressional session. Javits came out for re-appointment; but
Pell, who chaired the proceedings, filibustered his way
through the agenda for the last days of that session. Eventually
the hearing ended with none of the issues resolved; with some
passing allusions to grocers and lumberjacks; and with the
expected victory of mind over natter. Although it was too late,
the main purpose of a year's work had been served, to force a
vote from the committee.
The count went along party lines, with only Jennings Randolph holding firm. Walter Mondale and Gaylord Nelson
abstained. The committee was spared having to break ranks on
their privilege: they only voted, 7 to 6, on whether or not to
vote. All the Republicans and a majority of the Democrats
informed Pell that if a vote on nomination itself were to take
place it would go against him. Procedure allowed Pell to
prevent that vote. In the opinion of the committee staff, this
case had come as close as any in modern times to upsetting the
practice of senatorial courtesy.
I met with Pell after the hearings, and he agreed that he
would withdraw his opposition to me if Gerald Ford won the
election.
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